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No. 20070802 - CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JASON CODY,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
WILLARD LOWE And Renee Hancock,

Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLEE WILLARD LOWE'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this
case. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Lexis 2006). On October 3, 2007, the
Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Lexis 2006).

ISSUES PRESENTED

I.

This Court Should Decline to Address the Appeal as the Brief
Does Not Comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Does Not State a Legal Basis for Review,
Appellant's Brief lacks any legal argument and provides no citation to

applicable case law supporting the claim of denial of due process of law by the
District Court or the respective clerks and presiding judges. As such, Cody has
provided no legal basis for overturning the District Court ruling.
7. Standard of Review
This question does not involve review of the trial court's order and
therefore no standard of review applies.

II.

Plaintiff's Due Process argument was not raised in the court
below and as such should not be addressed for the first time on
appeal.
Defendant's contention that he has been denied due process of law in

violation of the "Fo[u]rth A m e n d m e n t the Fifth Amendment, a n d the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America" is raised for the
first time in this a p p e a l a n d should not be addressed here.
J. Standard of Review
This queslion does not involve review of the trial court's order and
therefore no standard of review applies.
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2. Preservation of the Issue
Cody failed to raise the constitutional issues before the trial court and has
not properly preserved them. Luke v. Redko Int'l, N. V., 2005 UT App 517 (citing
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (UT App. 1997)).

III.

Cody was not denied Due Process when the District Court
Reviewed the Pleadings and Made a Ruling Based on Those
Pleadings

A.
Consideration of the Motion to Dismiss Does not violate the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure or deny Plaintiff Due Process of Law,
Trial courts have broad discretion to determine how a case will proceed.
Branden Miles, acting pro bono in this matter, filed a Motion to Dismiss with the
District Court on July 5, 2007. The Motion was filed prior to any hearings, motions
to submit, requests for default, or setting of trial dates pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(h). Did the District Court fail to comply with the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure when they reviewed all pleadings on the record?
1. Standard of Review
Appellate courts review the trial court's interpretation of rules for
correctness.

State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995) ("The standard of

review for a simple legal interpretation of a rule...is correctness"); Utah Dept. of
Environment. Quality v. Redd, 2002 UT 50,11 12 ("where this review requires us to
examine statutory language, w e look first to the plain meaning of the statute").

3

2. Preservation of the Issue

Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock filed the Motion to Dismiss, and Cody
opposed the motion. R at 032 - 050 and R at 097 -108. The court entered an
order granting the Defendant's Motion on August 23, 2007. R at 120 -122.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Annotated §78-7-5(3)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b), (c), and (h).
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pro se Appellant Jason Cody appeals the trial court's final order that
granted dismissal to Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock. Cody sued Lowe
and Hancock to recover damages he claims were caused by Hancock
and Lowe's testimony in a criminal case in which Cody was the
Defendant.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Cody claims that the District Court violated his rights when they
dismissed the civil action against Lowe and Hancock. The original action
arises as a result of Lowe's and Hancock's testimony against Cody in a
criminal trial in which Cody was convicted of assaulting Lowe and
Hancock in a dispute over the location of a potted plant.
Cody filed his first complaint against Lowe and Hancock, alleging
harassment, malicious mischief, obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting
false claims, conspiracy to commit perjury and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, on May 17, 2007. R. at 001. His amended complaint,
adding an allegation of Malicious prosecution was filed on June 4, 2007.
R. at 010-013. Lowe and Hancock received notice of this action on June
5

11, 2007. R. a\ 025-026. Lowe a n d Hancock, being elderly a n d on fixed
incomes, were unable to afford an attorney and unfamiliar with the legal
process so they c o n t a c t e d attorney Branden Miles for advice. Mr. Miles
received permission from his employer to assist Lowe and Hancock as a
pro bono attorney.
Through Mr. Miles, Lowe a n d Hancock filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim on July 5, 2007. R. at 032-050. Cody filed an
"Order to Enter Judgment by Default in Favor of the Plaintiff" on July 5,
2007, the same day that the Motion to Dismiss was received by the District
Court. R. at 029.
Cody's Motion to Enter Default Judgment was filed fifteen days later
on July 20, 2007. R. at 060. On that same day, Cody also asked the District
Court for leave to a m e n d his complaint a second time. R. 076-083.
On July 23, Cody filed an opposition to Lowe a n d Hancock's Motion
to Dismiss. R. at 097. Lowe a n d Hancock moved to consolidate the cases
on July 26, 2007 a n d Cody opposed consolidation on August 13, 2007. R.
at 109, R. at 117.
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On August 23, 2007, after reviewing the pleadings, the Honorable
Judge Ernie Jones granted the Motion to Dismiss. R. at 120-122. Cody filed
a notice of appeal on September 21, 2007. R. at 125.
Statement of Facts
On May 18, 2006, the Appellant, Jason Cody, brutally assaulted
Appellees Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock in front of their home. R. at
032 (Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, p. 1). A neighbor
intervened and police were called to the scene. R. at 033 [Id. at 2). Mr.
Lowe and Ms. Hancock were transported to the hospital and Cody was
taken to the Weber County Jail. R. at 033 (/d.) Mr. Lowe had sustained
multiple wounds to his head and Ms. Hancock was treated for a broken
bone and a partially severed pinky, the results of being bitten by Cody. R.
at 033 (Id.)
Cody was tried and convicted of Aggravated Assault, a thirddegree felony; Assault with Substantial Bodily Injury, a class A
misdemeanor; and Criminal Mischief, a class A misdemeanor as a result of
the incident.1 R. at 034 [Id. at 3.). Both Lowe and Hancock, as the victims

1

The case number for the Criminal charges is 061902461.
7

of the assaults, testified during the criminal trial as to the incident and the
injuries they sustained.
Cody filed this suit in response to the incidents outlined above.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the trial court in all respects. Cody raises only
one issue on appeal and has not provided any information which requires
or supports the reversal of the trial court.
First, the Appellant's Brief fails to meet even the basic requirements
outlined in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or the "pro se guide"
provided to Cody by the Supreme Court of Utah on October 3, 2007. At
a minimum, the brief should include an argument section supported by
citations to the law and appropriate precedent. Cody has not provided
any such argument for the Appellee to respond to or for the Court to base
a decision on. Therefore, the Court should decline to address the issue
presented.
Second, Cody did not raise any claim that the denial of his Motion
for Entry of Default violated his federal constitutional rights before the trial
court. He is therefore barred from asserting them for the first time on
appeal.

8

Finally, the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss, even
though it was filed outside of the time prescribed for an answer. Cody's
Complaint was frivolous and failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. His Motion for Entry of Default, filed fifteen days after
the Motion to Dismiss, was insufficient to support a default judgment given
the pleadings before the trial court. Default judgments must be requested
by the Plaintiff and are granted only if the trial court determines that the
judgment is warranted. The three day delay in the filing of the Motion to
Dismiss is, at best, harmless error. Even if the default judgment had been
entered prior to Lowe a n d Hancock's Motion to Dismiss, the judge has the
discretion to set aside the judgment for g o o d cause a n d such would have
been the case here.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Should Decline to Address the A p p e a l as the Brief
Does Not Comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Does Not State a Legal Basis for Review.
The procedure for filing an appeal, including the minimum

requirements of an Appellant Brief, is provided for in the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 24. Notably lacking in the
Appellant's Brief is an argument section. "The argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented...with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on.1' Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis a d d e d ) . Although
Cody makes numerous contentions in his "Summary of Argument" and
"Conclusion" the brief lacks an "Argument" section and is conspicuously
devoid of any citation to authorities and statutes.

Failure to properly brief

an issue is sufficient grounds for this Court to assume the correctness of the
trial court's decision a n d affirm the trial court. See e.g., Carrier v. Salt Lake
County, 2004 UT 98,11 43 ("it is well established that a reviewing court will
not address arguments that are not adequately briefed"); State v.
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (UT 1989) (declining to address issue when
"brief wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support" argument);
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Selvage v. JJ. Johnson and Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1264 (UT App. 1996)
(declining to address issue where party "cites no authority" or "any further
analysis" in support of argument).
Cody has not provided this Court with any legal framework upon
which to base a review and as such, this Court should decline to address
the issue.

II.

Appellant's Due Process Argument was Not Raised in the Court
Below and Should Not be Addressed for the First Time on
Appeal.
As a general rule, issues raised for the first time on appeal are not

addressed by the reviewing court. Carrier, 2004 UT 98 U 43. The exception
to this rule is found where the appellant "can demonstrate exceptional
circumstances" as to why the issue was not raised at the trial level.2 Pugh
v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, H 18. Cody failed to raise the Federal
Constitutional question before the trial court and is raising it here for the
first time. Cody has provided no support for his claim that he was denied
due process in order to meet the high standard for a showing of
exceptional circumstances. Id.
2

A second exception has been carved out in cases where Appellant can show the
trial court committed "plain error." State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, ^ 39. This exception will
be addressed in Section III in addressing the actions taken by the District Court.
11

The Appellant Brief is sadly lacking in any legal argument, but it is
clear that Cody bases his claim on the so called "failure...to comply with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." [Appellant's Brief, p. 3]. Failure to
comply with a state or local regulation alone will not give rise to Federal
Constitutional protections. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
This issue has not been briefed and the bald accusations of
Appellant at this late date do not provide a legal basis for review of the
District Court's decision.

III.

Cody was not Denied Due Process when the District Court
Reviewed the Pleadings and M a d e a Ruling Based on those
Pleadings.

A.

Consideration of the Motion to Dismiss does not Violate the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.3
Trial judges are granted broad discretion in determining the process

of litigation in their court. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694,
702 (UT App. 1994); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3) (Lexis 2006) (Court

3

It is important to note here that Appellant has waived the right to argue the merits
of the Motion to Dismiss. His only argument, both here and at the trial level, consists of
his misunderstanding as to the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure and entry of
Default Judgment. Although the Dismissal was unquestionably warranted, by not raising
the question, Appellant has waived any issue on the merits of the Dismissal itself.
12

has authority to "provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it
or its officers"). In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by Lowe and Hancock.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings, or Motion to Dismiss, at any time that will not
"delay the trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c). Although the Motion to Dismiss was
received three days beyond the twenty days prescribed for filing an
answer, Appellant was not prejudiced by this delay. The Motion to Dismiss
was filed with the trial court and a copy sent to Appellant prior to a Notice
of Default or even a Motion requesting that the trial court enter a default.
R. at 032-050 and R. at 060-064 (Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Enter
Judgment by Default, respectively).
Cody makes several claims based on the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The sum a n d substance is that the Second District Court Clerk
and Judge Ernie Jones attempted to "circumvent the law to suit their own
personal preference" in denying him the default judgment that he was
entitled to. [Appellant's Brief, p. 4]. Default Judgment c a n be entered in
one of two ways: 1) by the clerk upon motion by the Plaintiff; or 2) upon
application to the Court. Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b).

13

Before a clerk c a n enter a default judgment, four factors must be
met. Of particular concern for this case is the fourth factor, requiring that
the judgment be for a "certain sum or for a sum that c a n be made certain
by computation." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)(C) and (D). The Amended
Complaint called for an "award of actual damages" in the amount of
$50,000, plus punitive damages and fees. R. at 010-013 (Amended CompI.
p. 4). Neither the Complaint, nor the Amended Complaint offered proof
of damages sufficient to allow entry of judgment by the Clerk. See, e.g.
Skanchy v. Calcados Off ope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (UT 1998) ("if the
damages claimed are unliquidated, a default judgment c a n be entered
only by a judge). Therefore, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court Clerk was precluded from entering default judgment in this case.
Before a judge c a n enter a default where the claim involves
unliquidated damages, an application must be m a d e to the court
requesting the entry of default. Utah R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2) (Lexis 2006).
Cody's application for entry of default was filed with the Court on July 20,
2007, fifteen days after the Motion to Dismiss was filed a n d taken under
consideration by the Judge. R. at 060. (Motion to Enter Judgment by
Default in Favor of Plaintiff). In order to enter judgment on this Complaint,
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Judge Jones was required to "review the complaint, determine whether
the allegations state a valid claim for relief, and award damages in an
amount that is supported by some valid evidence." Calcados Ortope SA,
952 P.2d at 1076. "The allegations in [this] complaint are not a sufficient
basis for awarding damages." Id. See also, Russell v. Martell, 618 P.2d
1193, 1195-96 (Utah 1984) (reversing default judgment where sums were
not certain and no hearing was held).
Default judgment is not guaranteed simply because a defendant
fails to appear. Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190
(Utah 1962). The Rules of Civil Procedure allow for entry of default "only if
the well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah
1998). In order to decide if there was some valid evidence to support the
claim, and to justify setting a hearing date to determine damages, Judge
Jones reviewed the Complaint, as well as Cody's Opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss and drew "all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Cody." R. at
120. (Ruling Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim, p. 1). As discussed in the Ruling, after giving Cody the benefit of
the doubt, Judge Jones found that "[e]ach of the Plaintiff's causes of

15

action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Plaintiff
has either failed to support each claim with adequate factual support, or
has failed to state a cognizable cause of action in compliance with the
well-pleaded complaint rule." R. at 121 [Id. at p.2).
The trial court, pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered
the evidence before it in determining whether a default judgment was
warranted and what amount should be awarded. Even liberally
construed, the heart of Cody's argument is that the court erred in not
granting his motion for default judgment. As shown above, this argument
has no foundation in law or in fact. The trial court acted properly and the
ruling should be affirmed.

B.

Default Judgments are not favored in the law, and can be Set Aside
for Good Cause.

It is well-settled that default judgments are not favored in the law.
Heafhman, 377 P.2d at 190 (Utah 1962); see also, Menzies v. Galetka, 2006
UT 81, H 63 ("judgment by default is an extreme measure and a case
should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits"). When a default
judgment is entered in a case, the trial court has been given broad
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discretion in setting aside those judgments and "should be generally
indulgent toward vacating default judgments." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006
UT 81, H 63 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Cody claims that
the Rules of Civil Procedure require the judge to enter a default judgment
because the Answer was filed three days late. [Appellant's Brief, p.5].
While this claim is clearly erroneous, even if a default had been entered,
Lowe and Hancock would have been entitled to have the judgment set
aside. Once set aside, the trial court would have considered the Motion
to Dismiss; therefore, at most, the trial court's refusal of the motion to enter
default was harmless error. As such, Cody has failed to establish sufficient
grounds for reversal of the dismissal and the trial court ruling must be
upheld.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court. Lowe a n d Hancock
established that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure supported dismissal in
the lower court a n d that Cody did not properly preserve a due process
claim in the lower court. Because the only issue raised in this appeal is the
alleged violation of his due process rights, which were not properly
preserved, this Court should refuse to consider the appeal. Further, as

17

shown above, the trial court properly followed the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in considering the evidence and ruling on the pleadings.
Therefore, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.

DATED this | X

day of

7\(AA/

. 2008.

. JrfnsUn / 1

/M/(

BRANDEN B. MILES
Attorney for Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

' day of , j (AfU.

2008,1 caused

to be served, by U.S. Mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing,
APPELLEE WILLARD LOWE AND RENEE HANCOCK BRIEF, to the following:
Jason Cody
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden, UT 84409

j){^/)A^
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Addendum
A

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNT^ 0 5 £QQJ
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

JASON CODY,
Plaintiff,

A TjQP kipw

RULING GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM

vs.
WILLARD LOWE and
RENEE HANCOCK,

Civil No. 070902903
Judge Ernie W. Jones

Defendants.

The Defendants, Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock, have moved to dismiss Mr.
Cody's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mr.
Cody has opposed the motion. Having considered the parties' memoranda, the Court
grants the motion for the reasons stated in the Defendants' memorandum.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) "admits the facts alleged in the
complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp.} 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). In reviewing the
complaint, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Cody.
On May 18, 2006, the Plaintiff, Jason Brad Cody, brutally assaulted the
Defendants. On February 15, 2007, the Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated assault,
assault with substantial bodily injury, and criminal mischief arising from his assault on the

Ruling Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
No. 070902903

Defendants. On May 17, 2007, the Plaintiff filed this complaint against his victims,
stating seven causes of action.
Each of the Plaintiffs causes of action fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The Plaintiff has either failed to support each claim with adequate factual
support, or has failed to state a cognizable cause of action in compliance with the wellpleaded complaint rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Additionally, the Plaintiff fails to
support claims of fraud or other forms of deception with particularity according to Utah
R. Civ. P. 9(b).
The Court, therefore, grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court
dismisses the complaint with prejudice. Mr. Miles will please prepare the appropriate
order.
Dated this,? 3 day of August, 2007.

2

Ruling Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
No. 070902903

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the Z^day of August, 2007,1 sent a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ruling as follows:

Branden B. Miles
Counsel for Defendants
2380 Washington Blvd. 2nd Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401

Jason B. Cody
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden, UT 84409-1182
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Addendum
B

BRANDEN B. MILES, UBN 9777
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD. 2
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

ND

f llfc C O P Y
S

FLOOR

lla

*

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
)

JASON CODY
Plaintiff

)
) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
) STATE A CLAIM
)

v.
WILLARD LOWE
RENEE HANCOCK

) Case No. 070902903 MI (Lowe)
) Case No. 070902904 MI (Hancock)
)
) Judge Roger S. Dutson
) Judge Ernie W. Jones
)

Defendants

)
)

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants move the court for
an order dismissing claims one through seven in the plaintiffs complaint. The grounds for this motion are
that each claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff has either failed to
support each claim with adequate factual support, or the plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable cause
of action in compliance with the well-pleaded complaint rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Additionally, the plaintiff fails to support claims of fraud or other forms of deception with particularity
according to Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is supported by the
memorandum in support filed with this motion and all other pleadings on file with the court in this action.
FACTS
On May 18, 2006, the plaintiff, Jason Brad Cody, brutally assaulted Willard Lowe and Renee
Hancock in front of their home. During a dispute over the location of a potted tree, the plaintiff

punched Willard Lowe, a 74-year-old man who weighed about 125 pounds, in the stomach causing
him to fall to the ground. Mr. Lowe had not hit the Defendant nor threatened to do so prior to his being
struck. Once Mr Lowe fell to the ground, the Defendant, who was fifty-six and weighed more than
200 pounds, jumped on top of Mr. Lowe and pinned his arms underneath him. From this position, the
Defendant repeatedly punched, slapped, and slammed Mr. Lowe's head onto the asphalt of the
roadway.
Mr. Lowe struggled to get out from under the Plaintiff, but was unable to because of his size.
Renee Hancock is 69 years old. She observed the Plaintiff punching Mr. Lowe repeatedly and she ran
out to help Mr. Lowe. Ms. Hancock attempted to pull the Plaintiff off of Mr. Lowe, but the Plaintiff
seized her hand and bit down on it, breaking a bone and severing a tendon in her finger.
Shortly after the Plaintiff bit through Ms. Lowe's hand, a neighbor pulled the Plaintiff off Mr.
Lowe and separated the parties. Multiple people then called the police. The police and medical
personnel arrived to treat Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock. Both were transported to the hospital. Mr.
Lowe sustained multiple abrasions to his head, his eye was severely swollen, and he was bleeding
profusely from various cuts in his head. Ms. Hancock was treated for her broken bone and had a
tendon partially severed in her pinky. She has undergone physical therapy but continues to have
problems with numbness and her ability to hold things with that hand.
The Plaintiff complained of breathing difficulty, but ultimately it was determined that he was fine
and he was transported to the Weber County Jail. He was charged with Aggravated Assault, a third
degree felony; Assault with Substantial Bodily Injury, a class A misdemeanor; and Criminal Mischief, a
class A misdemeanor. Information on the criminal case can be found under case number 061902461.
2

On February 15, 2007, after the evidence was heard during a non-jury trial, the Plaintiff was found
guilty beyond all reasonable doubt for these offenses. On April 2, the Plaintiff was sentenced to a
suspended prison sentence with formal probation and 180 days in the Weber County Jail. He is
currently still and inmate at the jail where he has now commenced this frivolous lawsuit.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE HE FAILS TO
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
According to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim may be dismissed

when the plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." URCP 12(b)(6). A wellplead complaint sets forth "(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled."
URCP 8(a). Additionally, claims that allege fraud or any sort of misrepresentations, omissions, or other
forms of deception must be stated with particularity. URCP 9(b). Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982).
A plaintiff must assert facts to support the conclusion that he has been, somehow, wronged. In
Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, a plaintiff submitted a three-paragraph complaint which alleged that
the defendants conspired together to annoy, threaten, and intimidate the plaintiff until the plaintiff had to
discontinue his business and, as a result, suffered damages. Utah Steel & Iron Co. V. Bosch, 475
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court denied. On
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, reasoning that a mere allegation that the defendants conspired to annoy, threaten, and
3

intimidate the plaintiff is insufficient when it does not state the nature or substance of the acts alleged
committed by the defendants. Id. The court further reasoned that a well-plead complaint should "give
the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of
the type of litigation involved." Id. Citing Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P 2d 453 (Utah 1955).
Even pro se plaintiffs who have no legal training or experience must assert a certain amount of
specificity in their complaints, especially when involving allegations of fraud or deception. In Heathman
v. Hatch, a layperson sued his attorney, supporting his claim with a 33-page complaint which alleged
the defendant was guilty of fraud, conspiracy, and negligence. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990
(Utah 1962). Though a few specific facts were asserted, the court found that the terms "fraud,
conspiracy, and negligence" were conclusory accusations, for they only asserted legal conclusions
rather than giving any specific facts to support those conclusions. Id. The court reasoned that the
objective of Rule 8(a) is to require "that the essential facts upon which redress is sought be set forth
with simplicity, brevity, clarity, and certainty so that it can be determined whether there exists a legal
basis for the relief claimed." Id. Similarly, in a case which arose out of Heathman v. Hatch, the court
reasoned that a complaint alleging false affidavits and false pleadings should provide the "contents,
nature, or substance of the alleged false statements]." Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d
189 (Utah 1962). The court found that, given the general accusations contained in the complaint, "it
[was] clear beyond question that no claim was stated upon which relief could be granted." Id.

I Specifically, the court found this claim insufficient because it gave no notice to the defendants about the nature or
substance of the acts complained of nor was there any mention of causation between the defendants' actions and
the alleged effect on the plaintiff Utah Steel & iron Co. V Bosch, 475 P 2d 1019 (Utah 1970).

4

A,

Malicious Prosecution

In order to successfully maintain a claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must establish
four elements: (1) that the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, (2) the criminal
proceeding was initiated without probable cause, (3) the criminal proceeding was for purposes of
malice rather than bringing an offender to justice, and (4) the criminal proceedings terminated in the
accused's (the plaintiffs) favor. Failure to establish any one of the four elements is fatal to the plaintiffs
cause of action. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 at 959. Gilbert v. Paul R. Inc &
Callister, 981 P. 2d 841 (Utah 1999), Specifically, malicious prosecution only occurs when the
defendant2 initiates criminal proceedings against an innocent plaintiff8. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). (That plaintiff was prosecuted andfound guilty is an absolute affirmative
defense.)
On February 15, 2007, the plaintiff in this case, Jason Cody, was convicted of aggravated
assault (a 3rd degree felony), assault with substantial bodily injury (a class A misdemeanor), and criminal
mischief (a class A misdemeanor) for causing bodily injury to both defendants, Willard Lowe and
Renee Hancock, which occurred on May 18,2006. The plaintiff was sentenced to 180 days in jail.
Because the plaintiff here was successfully prosecuted and found guilty beyond any reasonable doubt,
the Court should grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim.4

1 Defendant in the civil suit, victim or witness in the prior criminal action.
2 Plaintiff in the civil suit, defendant in the prior criminal action.
3 It should also be noted that though the plaintiff alleges
prosecution, he fails to support this claim with any facts.
judgment, the plaintiffs claim for malicious prosecution
which relief can be granted as he has asserted no facts to

an 8th cause of action against the defendants for malicious
Therefore, should the court decide to not give summary
should at least be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
support his claim. URCP 12(b)(6). URCP 8(a).

5

B.

Claims Based on Allegations of Deception

Claims that allege fraud or any sort of misrepresentations, omissions, or other forms of
deception must be stated with particularity so as to give the defendant notice of the "contents, nature, or
substance of the alleged false statements[s]. URCP 9(b). Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d
966 (Utah 1982). (When a plaintiff complains of conduct (i described by such general terms as
libel intimidate, or false statements, the allegation of the conclusion is not sufficient; the
pleading must describe the nature or the substance of the acts or words complained of )
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962). Mere allegations are insufficient
when the nature and substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendant are not stated, and legal
conclusions must be supported by facts. Utah Steel & Iron Co. V. Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1970). Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 (Utah 1962).
The first four claims addressed here are all similar in two ways. First, each claim asserts that the
defendants have engaged in some sort of deception; therefore, the plaintiff is required to state a claim
with particularity. Second, each claim fails to support the plaintiffs conclusory accusation of deception
with any facts, particular or otherwise, regarding the nature or substance of the acts or statements
complained of, thereby not giving any notice to the defendant about the contents, nature, or substance
of the alleged false statements.

6

For his claims of obstruction of justice5, perjury6, conspiracy7, and submitting a false claim8, the
plaintiff only asserts broad, conclusory allegations without providing any facts to show the contents,
nature, and substance of the alleged acts committed or statements made by the defendants. The plaintiff
even fails to provide a date or period of time when any of these alleged falsities occurred. For example,
in his claim for obstruction of justice, the plaintiff only alleges that the defendants "provided false and
erroneous information" to the police and courts which caused the plaintiff to be arrested, prosecuted,
and ultimately convicted.9 Additionally, in his claim for perjury, the plaintiff only alleges that the
defendants gave false information in affidavits and that the defendants gave false testimony in court.10

2 The plaintiffs claims for obstruction of justice are stated as follows: (1) "Defendant has provided false erroneous
information and statements to the police in attempts to cause problems for the Plaintiff and causing the Plaintiff to be
arrested and jailed by the city police" and (2) "Defendant has provided false and erroneous information to the courts
causing them to take actions against Plaintiff." These claims are brought against both defendants.
3 The plaintiffs claims for perjury are stated as follows: (1) "Defendant has sworn to false information in affidavits"
and (2) "Defendant has given false testimony to the courts on several occasions concerning the Plaintiff." These
claims are brought against both defendants.
4 The plaintiffs claim for conspiracy to commit perjury and obstruction of justice is stated as follows: "Defendant
has conspired with other persons to submit false information to police and false testimony to the courts." This claim
is brought against both defendants.
5The plaintiffs claim for submitting a false claim is stated as follows: "Defendant has submitted false erroneous
claims to the court with regard to medical expenses and restitution." This claim is brought against both defendants.
6 Additionally, as codified in the Utah Criminal Code, obstruction of justice occurs only when the person accused of
obstruction intends to "hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or
punishment of any person." Utah Code Ann. 76-8-306. Here, the defendants provided information to police,
prosecutors, and the court with the intent to do just the opposite-the defendants wanted the plaintiff investigated,
apprehended, prosecuted, convicted, and punished. The plaintiff even supports this view by alleging in his
complaint that the information provided by the defendants caused the plaintiff to be arrested, jailed, prosecuted, and
convicted. Therefore, because the defendants did not obstruct justice but, instead, initiated it, the plaintiff has no
claim against the defendants for obstruction of justice. Further, obstruction of justice is an offense against the state,
so it is questionable whether the plaintiff even has a legitimate cause of action for such an offense.
7 Further, according to section 76-8-505 of the Utah Criminal Code, a person may not be found guilty of falsification
in official matters when the only proof of falsification is a mere contradiction between the accused and another
witness. Utah Code Ann. 76-8-505(1) Here, the plaintiffs complaint only provides the implied assertion that he
believes the defendants' statement were false. Such evidence alone is not enough to prove perjury. Additionally,
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Similarly, in his claim for submitting a false claim, the plaintiff only alleges that the defendants submitted
false claims to the court regarding medical expenses, though the plaintiff does not allege any facts about
the nature or cause of these medical expenses or even why the defendants' medical expenses have
anything to do with the plaintiff. Finally, Plaintiffs claims only allege criminal offenses which are
prosecuted by the government. He has not identified a legally-cognizable, private cause of action.
Because the plaintiff only asserts broad, conclusory accusations that do not give the defendant notice of
the content, nature, or substance of the alleged acts and statements complained of, the plaintiffs claim
should be dismissed.
Similar to the plaintiffs claims that the defendant has obstructed justice and perjured himself,
the plaintiff also asserts the broad, conclusory allegation that the defendant has conspired with
unidentified "other persons" to commit obstruction of justice and perjury. A plaintiff who asserts that the
defendant is liable for civil conspiracy must prove all of the following five elements: (1) a combination of
two or more persons, (2) with a common object to accomplish, (3) had a meeting of the minds about
that object to be accomplished or the course of action to accomplish that object, (4) those persons
participated in one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) caused damages to the plaintiff as a proximate
result of their actions. Alta Indus v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993); Israel Pagan Estates v.
Cannon, 746 P. 2d 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Civil conspiracy is recognized as common law in
Utah and is similar to criminal conspiracy 76-4-201 of the Utah Code, requiring only the
additional element of damages.).

perjury is usually an offense against the state, so it is questionable whether the defendant even has a cognizable
cause of action for perjury.
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Here, similar to the other claims for perjury and obstruction of justice, the plaintiff fails to
support his broad, conclusory allegations by providing any facts regarding the contents, nature, or
substance of the acts and false statements alleged committed by the defendant. Additionally, the plaintiff
only asserts the legal conclusion that the defendants are liable for conspiracy without supporting that
conclusion with any facts. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not specify who the other conspirators were,
the conspirators' common objective, or any meeting of the mind among the unknown conspirators.
In conclusion, because the plaintiff has only asserted broad, conclusory allegations without
giving any facts to show the contents, nature, and substance of the alleged acts committed and
statements made by the defendant and because the plaintiff has, instead, only asserted legal conclusions
which are also not supported by any facts, the plaintiffs claims for civil conspiracy, perjury,
obstruction of justice, and submitting a false claim should all be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
C.

General Claims

A well-plead complaint should "give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis and
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Utah Steel & Iron Co.
V. Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970). Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453 (Utah 1955). Mere
accusations are not enough if the nature or substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendant
are not stated. Utah Steel & Iron Co. V. Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970). Furthermore, legal
conclusions and accusations must be supported by facts. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 (Utah
1962). Essentially, a plaintiff must supply the defendant and the court with enough information to know
both the legal cause of action the claim is brought under and the basic facts which support that the
9

plaintiff has a claim. Here, in each claim, the plaintiff fails to do one, the other, or both. The remaining
claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because either
(1) the claims are not supported by sufficient facts and are, instead, conclusory accusations; or (2) the
claims do not state a cognizable cause of action for which there is a remedy at law.
1.

Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress

Intentional infliction of emotional distress is only actionable if (1) the defendant's conduct is
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and
morality; (2) the defendant intends to cause or acts in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing
emotional distress, (3) the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress; and (4) the defendant's conduct
proximately causes the plaintiffs emotional distress. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Utah Ct. App.
2004). Bennett v. Jones, 70 P. 3d 17 (Utah 2003).
Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are highly subjective and volatile in nature:
they are easily fabricated, easy to assert, and hard to defend against. For those reasons, Utah courts
have strictly limited recovery under emotional distress claims. Bennett v. Jones, 70 P. 3d 17. For a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to survive, the conduct claimed to be distressing "must
evoke outrage or revulsion, it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair." Id. "Conduct is not
outrageous merely because it is tortuous, injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to
punitive damages or because it is illegal.. . and clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."Id. For example, derogatory statements do
not give rise to a claim of emotional distress. Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., 122 P.3d 891
(Utah Ct. App. 2005). Similarly, a mere claim of improper filing of a law suit or abusive litigation is
10

also not enough to show emotional distress. Amderson Dev. Co., v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah
2005).
The conduct described in the plaintiffs complaint11 arose from nothing more than a dispute over
a potted tree. A dispute between neighbors is not uncommon: it is definitely not outrageous or
revolting, and little else is less trivial. The plaintiff has alleged no facts which connect the defendant's
conduct to the plaintiffs loss of home or spouse, especially given that the plaintiffs own actions which
resulted in his criminal conviction and 180-day jail sentence for assaulting the defendants could have
been the proximate cause of those events. Additionally, the plaintiff has failed to state with any
specificity the so-called "various diseases and disorders" from which he allegedly now suffers nor are
any facts given from which it can even be inferred that those diseases and disorders are "severe."
In conclusion, because the plaintiff has given inadequate factual support that he suffers from
severe emotional distress, because the plaintiff has given inadequate factual support that the defendant
caused such distress, and because the plaintiff has, in general, not supported his claim with adequate
facts to show the nature and substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendants, the court
should dismiss plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
2.

Harassment

The court should dismiss the plaintiffs claim against the defendant for harassment because there

8 The plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleges the following: "Through the
aforementioned actions of the Defendants], [they] have caused the Plaintiff to be evicted from his home of 34 years
and the dissolution of his marriage and the subsequent loss of his home itself. Also causing Plaintiffs health
problems and exacerbation of various diseases and disorders suffered by Plaintiff, thereby causing Plaintiff to suffer
extreme emotional distress." This claim is brought against both defendants.
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is no cognizable, civil cause of action for, simply, harassment.12 Instead, harassment is the result of
certain actions, conditions, or behavior, and occasionally the law regulates that behavior and provides a
remedy for the harassment. For example, trespass, assault, or private nuisance are types of behaviors
that cause harassment and provide a plaintiff with a cognizable cause of action.
a. Assault
Assault is intentionally causing another person reasonable, imminent apprehension of harmful or
offensive contact. Restatement (Second) of Torts, 21. Furthermore, a person is not liable for assault
for mere words or gestures unless those words and gestures are coupled together with other acts or
circumstances that make a person reasonably apprehensive of imminent harmful or offensive contact.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 31.
Here, the plaintiff only alleges that the defendant made gestures at the plaintiff and called the
plaintiff vulgar names.13 The plaintiff does not provide any facts to describe the alleged gestures or
language or any surrounding circumstances. Mere name calling alone is not enough to show that the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff for assault, and without any further facts or detail it is impossible to
determine whether the plaintiff has a claim for assault. Thus, the plaintiffs claim for assault should be
dismissed.

9 Harassment is also considered a crime under the Utah Criminal Code when a person "with intent to frighten or
harass another . . . communicates a written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-5106 Even if the criminal harassment statute were used as a model for a civil offense of harassment, the plaintiff has
asserted no facts to support either that the defendant communicated a written or recorded threat or that the
defendant threatened the plaintiff with a violent felony.
10 The plaintiffs claim under a cause of action heading for harassment is stated as follows: "Defendant engaged in
actions to harass plaintiff by making various gestures at Plaintiff and by calling Plaintiff vulgar names and using
obscene language." This claim is only brought against defendant Willard Lowe.
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b. Private Nuisance
Under a claim of private nuisance, a plaintiff must show (1) an existence of injury to the
plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his property and (2) an injury that is both substantial and unreasonable.
Walker Drug Co., Inc. V La Sal Oil Co., 972 P 2d 1238 (Utah, 1998). "A substantial injury is a
significant injury, a harm of importance, involving more than a slight inconvenience or petty annoyance.'
Id (It is undisputed that the interference with the plaintiff's property must be significant.)
Furthermore, "unsubstantiated fears . . . are not the kind of substantial and significant interference with a
landowner's use and enjoyment of his property" which is contemplated under an action for private
nuisance. Id. (Unsubstantiated fear of contamination on adjacent property is not a significant
interference.)
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants placed various objects in the roadway which
obstructed the plaintiffs view and made it difficult for him to enter and exit his driveway.14 It is also
important to clarify that the plaintiff is not alleging that the defendants blocked his driveway, preventing
the plaintiff from exiting or entering his property; rather, the plaintiff is alleging that the defendants
obstructed his view. The first object, the potted tree, is placed where it is in order to mark the boundary
of the defendant's property-hardly an unreasonable action. As a potted tree, the trunk is thin, the tree
has few leaves and branches, and the widest portion of this condition is the pot in which the tree is
planted. As for the defendant's truck and camper, it is not uncommon for a larger vehicle to obstruct

11 the plaintiffs claim, under a cause of action heading for harassment, are stated as follows: (1) "Defendant caused
a potted tree to be placed in the roadway near to Plaintiffs driveway to make it difficult for Plaintiff to access and
egress his driveway," and (2) "Defendant parked his pickup truck with large camper shell in the roadway at the end
of Plaintiff s driveway making it dangerous for Plaintiff to exit his driveway due to the obstructed view. This was
contrary to the Park's rules." These claims are brought against both defendants.
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the view for another vehicle. The parked truck was also not a permanent condition which constantly
obstructed the plaintiffs view as he entered and exited his driveway. Additionally, neither the tree nor
the truck are "substantial" or "significant" injury or harms of importance nor are they unusual; rather,
both are only petty annoyances that caused the plaintiff the slight inconvenience of having to be more
observant as he exited his driveway.
In conclusion, because the plaintiff has failed to assert any facts to show that he suffered from a
significant harm to the use and enjoyment of his property, the plaintiffs claims should be dismissed.
c. Trespass
Civil trespass is an intentional wrongful entry or physical invasion onto another's land. Walker
Drug Co., Inc. V. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998). Citing O 'Neil v. San Pedro, 114 P.
129 (Utah 1911) Also citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, 158. (A person is "liable to another
for trespass . . . if he intentionally enters land in the possession of the other. . . . ") Though under a
cause of action of harassment, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant "trespassed onto [his] leased
property after [being] told not to trespass."15 However, the plaintiff only asserts the legal conclusion
that the defendants trespassed without giving any facts to support that broad, conclusory allegation.
The plaintiff also fails to assert any damages which were caused by the defendant's trespass.
Damages for trespass are, generally, the difference between the value of the property immediately
before and immediately after the trespass or, alternatively, the cost of restoration or repair. Henderson
v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). (Trespassers who drove over grass and

12 The plaintiffs claim, under a cause of action heading for harassment, is stated as follows: "Defendant further
harassed Plaintiff by repeatedly trespassing on Plaintiffs leased property after he had been told not to trespass."
This claim is only brought against defendant Willard Lowe.
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knocked over signs only liable to property owner for nominal damages of one dollar.) However,
when no actual or substantial damages are shown, "the law will infer nominal damages for the
unauthorized entry onto the real property of another. Id. Nominal damages are "a trivial sum such as
one cent or one dollar [which is] awarded to the plaintiff whose legal right has been invaded but who
has failed to prove any compensatory damages. Id. (Citing Gould v. Mountain States Te. & Tel.
Co., 309 P.2d 802 (Utah 1982). (A considerable amount such as $100 for trespass is not
(i

nominal" damages).
In conclusion, because legal conclusions must be supported by facts so as to give the

defendants notice of the nature and substance of the acts alleged committed, because the plaintiff fails to
assert anything but a legal conclusion, and because the plaintiff fails to assert any damages, the plaintiffs
claim for trespass should be dismissed.
d. Remaining Charges
The plaintiffs final two claims under a cause of action for harassment assert that the defendant
took "unwelcome photographs" of the plaintiff, his wife, and their property and that the defendant made
false accusations16 about the plaintiff to management of a mobile home community.17 These allegations
alone are so vague that, without additional facts, it is impossible to determine what sort of cause of
action the plaintiff is suing under and should, therefore, be dismissed.

13 As the plaintiff is again alleging that the defendants made some sort of false statement, such a claim should also
be pled with particularity according to the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
14 The plaintiffs claims under a cause of action heading for harassment are stated as follows: (1) "Defendant
harassed Plaintiff by taking unwelcome photos of the Plaintiff and his spouse and their home and cars." This claim is
only brought against defendant Willard Lowe. (2) "Defendant engaged in actions to harass Plaintiff by making false
accusations that Plaintiff broke the rule of the Mobile Home Park by not having a vehicle properly registered and
licensed." This claim is only brought against Renee Hancock.
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2.

Malicious Mischief
Malicious mischief, or criminal mischief, is codified in the Utah Criminal Code, under which a

person commits criminal mischief if he "intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of
another." Utah Code Ann. 76-6-106(2)(c). An important element of malicious mischief is
intent-specifically, malice-and the plaintiff has not asserted any facts to show that the defendant acted
intentionally, let alone that the defendants acted with a malicious intent, to cause damage to the
plaintiffs property. If anything, the nature of the complained of actions seem like an accident.18 Yet
even if the plaintiffs claim could be viewed as negligent destruction of property, the plaintiff has not
alleged that the defendants owed him a duty which they later breached.
Malicious mischief, is above all else, destruction of property. The plaintiff makes several
accusations under his malicious mischief claim; however, three of them do not constitute damage to
property. First, the plaintiffs allegation that the defendant made false statements19 does not demonstrate
any damage to property. Second, the plaintiffs accusations that the defendant spread moth balls in
order to exacerbate the plaintiffs asthma are not destruction of property.20 Additionally, the plaintiff
even fails to allege any facts about where the moth balls were spread and without such facts it is nearly

15 The plaintiffs claim under cause of action heading malicious mischief alleges the following: (I) "Defendant is
responsibile for damage to Plaintiffs vehicle (scratches on paint), by causing his friend's front yard gate to open
and strike Plaintiffs vehicle while it was parked in Plaintiffs driveway." and (2) "Defendant caused damage to
Plaintiffs property by watering a shed wall of the Plaintiffs while watering his friend's yard." These claims are
brought against both defendants.
16 As the plaintiff is again alleging that the defendants made some sort of false statement, such a claim should also
be pled with particularity according to the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
18 The plaintiffs claim under a cause of action heading for malicious mischief is stated as follows: "Defendant
spread moth (2) ball crystals to exacerbate Plaintiffs asthma." This claim is only brought against defendant Renee
Hancock.
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impossible to contemplate any cause of action under which the plaintiff could sue. Finally, the
defendant's alleged attack on the plaintiff is also not destruction of property.
Assault is intentionally causing another person reasonable, imminent apprehension of harmful or
offensive contact. Restatement (Second) of Torts, 21. Battery is intentionally causing harmful or
offensive contact to another. Restatement (Second) of Torts, 13. Here, the plaintiff only alleges the
legal conclusion that the defendants assaulted him without providing any facts to support that
conclusion.21
In conclusion, because the plaintiff has only alleged legal conclusions without providing any facts
to support those conclusions, because the plaintiff has not given any facts to illustrate the nature and
substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendants, and because the plaintiff has not provided
enough facts to identify a cognizable cause of action under which he has a legitimate claim, the plaintiffs
claim should be dismissed.

20 The plaintiffs claim brought under a cause of action heading for malicious mischief is stated as follows:
"Defendant, without provocation, attacked and physically assaulted plaintiff while Plaintiff was standing at the end
of his driveway, a very short while later, Defendant's friend joined in the assault of the Plaintiff." This claim is only
brought against the defendant, Willard Lowe.
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CONCLUSION
In general, the plaintiffs entire complaint is a broad, conclusory accusation that is not supported
by any facts to illustrate the nature and substance of the acts alleged committed by the defendants. The
plaintiffs claims of obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting a false claim, and conspiracy are
allegations of fraud or deception which must be pled with particularity. Under each of those claims, the
plaintiff fails to provide any facts to show the contents, nature, or substance of the alleged false
statements and, therefore, does not give the defendants notice of the nature, basis, and grounds of the
claim. The remaining claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, and malicious
mischief are either legal conclusions which are not supported by any facts or are broad, conclusory
accusations which are not supported by facts sufficient enough to determine whether a cognizable cause
of action exists or whether the plaintiff has a legitimate claim under an identifiable cause of action.
For these reasons and the reasons set forth above, this court should dismiss each of the
Plaintiffs claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
DATED this 7th day of July 2007.

Branden B. Miles
Attorney for Defendant Renee Hancock
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed on the 7th day of July 2007, a copy of the foregoing MOTION
TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM to:

Jason B. Cody
P.O. Box 9732
Ogden,UT 84409-1182
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cvj^i- fhuitj U-W tW t Sc\ £ U tK.'j parti\_u*Jh VY'st^K, yt'xK^£Wc<&y )*.)u^..

C ^( to,' I +KJAW M>ti"f! Wr w;k? at^rr^^vH-p J^tKi.^t,
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XYM"frcK "(^ ^umr,iDicx>y Yud^ finest W / ^ ^ .n{t\»:ij to ^ K ^ o t il( +Ke

tv d^ue W_e^ f4.uj>tth xn.j, i^sttf:"xi[
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